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GESTALT SWITCH IN RUSSIAN FEDERALISM OR WHERE HAS  
ALL THE REGIONAL POWER GONE UNDER PUTIN? 
 
 
 
 
 “Power floats like money, like language, like theory..”  
(Baudrillard, 1994, p. 24) 
 
Introduction 
 
It has been declared over a decade ago that the ideational variables “moved back to the forefront 
of the political science agenda,”1 yet in comparative politics the turn to ideas has not widened 
much beyond the scholars of the EU.
2
  Only few studies of policy choices of postcommunist 
elites relied on ideational arguments.
3
  Recent studies of Russian and comparative federalism, 
more generally, also frame the analysis of political action privileging interests over ideas and 
objective over discursive structures.
4
  In this paradigm power balance and political actors’ incen-
tive structures are determined by such tangible variables as institutions, economic and financial 
resources, ethnicity and geographic location. The less tangible ideas, norms and rhetorical frames 
are absent. 
                                                 
1 Sheri Berman, “Ideas, Norms, and Culture in Political Analysis,” Comparative Politics (January 
2001), p. 231. 
2 On the EU, see for example, Vivien A. Schmidt and Claudio M. Radaelli, “Policy Change and 
Discourse in Europe: Conceptual and Methodological Issues,” West European Politics 27 (2), 2004, 183-
210; Craig Parson, A Certain Idea of Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003); Kathleen 
McNamara, The Currency of Ideas: Monetary Politics in the European Union (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1998); Peter A. Hall, “Policy Paradigms, Social Learning and the State: The Case of Economic 
Policymaking in Britain,” Comparative Politics 25 (3), 1993, 275-96.   
3 See Keith Darden, Economic Liberalism and Its Rivals: The Formation of International Institu-
tions among the Post-Soviet States (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Yoshiko M. Herrera, 
Imagined Economies: The Sources of Russian Regionalism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2005). Hilary Appel, A New Capitalist Order: Privatization & Ideology in Russia & Eastern Europe  
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2004). 
4 Kent Eaton, “Federalism in Europe and Latin America: Conceptualization, Causes, and Con-
sequences,” World Politics 60 (July 2008), 665-98.  For notable exceptions in the studies of Russian 
federalism, see J. Paul Goode, The Decline of Regionalism in Putin’s Russia: Boundary Issues (London: 
Routledge, 2011); Herrera 2005. 
Sharafutdinova, Gestalt Switch 
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 In this article I posit that comparative studies of federalism, including Russian federalism, 
can be enriched by engaging with the new concepts bringing attention to the power of ideas and 
discourse.  Furthermore, the ideational approach itself could be refined based on new puzzles 
such as the one from Russian federal politics addressed here.  The rationalist models including 
the bargaining model and rational choice institutionalism have been successful in addressing a 
variety of important questions about Russian federalism in the 1990s.
5
  They proved less capable 
of explaining the dismantling of Russian federalism, providing no convincing answer to the 
puzzle of the unexpectedly quick submission of powerful regional elites to Putin’s centralization 
policies. Advancing a new approach, I argue that understanding the reaction of regional elites to 
Putin’s centralization requires a reconsideration of the basis of regional power in the 1990s.  The 
rationalist focus on the structural determinants of power considered mostly in material terms 
needs to be complemented by the focus on the ideational basis of power.  With that aim I borrow 
the concept of discursive opportunity structures
6
 from the literature on social movements and 
argue that the power of regional elites in the 1990s resulted not only from their institutional 
status, economic wealth or ethnic mobilization but also from relying on discursive opportunity 
structures - “the discursive terrain[s] in which the meaning contests occur”7 - that privileged 
specific rhetorical frames. In the early 1990s the dominant frame centered on the themes of 
                                                 
5 For selected works, see Steven Solnick, “The Political Economy of Russian Federalism: A 
Framework for Analysis,” Problems of Post-Communism 43 (6), 2000, 13-25; Daniel Treisman, 
”Russia’s Ethnic Revival: The Separatist Activism of Regional Leaders in a Post-communist Order,” 
World Politics 49 (1), 1997, 212-49; Mikhail Filippov and Olga Shvetsova, “Asymmetric bilateral bar-
gaining in the new Russian Federation.  A path-dependence explanation,” Communist and Post-Com-
munist Studies 32 (1), 1999, 61-76; Peter Soderlund, “The significance of structural power resources in 
the Russian Bilateral treaty process 1994-1998,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 36 (2003), 
311-24. -68.  
6 The term is used interchangeably with “discursive fields.” 
7 David A. Snow, “Framing Processes, Ideology, and Discursive Fields,” in David A. Snow, 
Sarah A. Soule and Hanspeter Kriesi, eds. The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2004), p. 402. 
Sharafutdinova, Gestalt Switch 
 
3 
national self-determination and democratization and allowed for fusing the goals of democracy 
and federalism.  The reliance on this frame made the regions powerful in the 1990s allowing the 
regional governments to expand their mandates.  The discursive field changed towards the end of 
the 1990s and the new dominant frame advanced by Putin focused on state consolidation.  Reso-
nating with popular attitudes and seen as legitimate the new frame constrained the regions by 
limiting the grounds for claim-making and more assertive actions vis-à-vis the center. 
  
The Paradox of Regional Retreat 
The regions have accrued much power vis-à-vis the center in the 1990s.
8
  Some analysts claimed 
that the Russian Federation was moving towards a confederation or even territorial disintegration 
driven by the actions of wayward regions and the passivity of an increasingly weak center.
9
  Tak-
ing advantage of the rivalry between Gorbachev and Yeltsin and later between Russia’s legisla-
tive and executive powers, the regional leaders pressed for increased autonomy enjoying conces-
sions extended by Russia’s central elites.10  First in the ethnic republics and, later, in mostly 
Russian provinces, the elites threatened the center with “general strikes and regional tariffs, the 
confiscation of federal property, local state of emergency and even terrorist attacks.”11  The 
Kremlin’s appeasement to regional demands produced, as some observers described it, the col-
                                                 
8 For an overview of the literature on Russian regionalism, see J. Paul Goode, “The Fall and Rise 
of Regionalism?” Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 26 (2), June 2010, 233-56. 
9 Katherine Stoner-Weiss, Resisting the State: Reform and Retrenchment in Post-Soviet Russia 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Graeme Herd, “Russia: Systemic Transformation or 
Federal Collapse?”  Journal of Peace Research 36 (3), 1999, 259-69. 
10 Vera Tolz and Irina Busygina, “Regional Governors and the Kremlin: the Ongoing Battle for 
Power,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 30 (4), 1997, 401-26. 
11 Treisman, Daniel.  After the Deluge: Regional Crises and Political Consolidation in Russia 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press 1999), p. 2.   
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4 
lection of personal fiefdoms
12
 across Russia.  Others referred to feudal absolutism
13
 and contem-
plated about the likelihood of Russia’s breakdown.14  In this context, Putin’s reforms of the 
institutional, legal and fiscal aspects of Russia’s federal system were widely interpreted as coun-
tering the disintegrative tendencies of Yeltsin’s period.15  Putin’s ‘power vertical’ that subsumed 
the governors was conceived as a mechanism of strengthening the Russian state. 
Although widely recognized and coherent, this story of the evolution of the Russian Fed-
eration is at best incomplete.  Politics is not simply bargaining based on the available power 
resources conceived strictly in material terms and institutions.  Politics is “about the definition, 
pursuit, and distribution of justifiable power”16 (emphasis mine).  Political action is taken in the 
broader socio-political context characterized by shared ideas, beliefs and perceptions about what 
is relevant, applicable, sound and justifiable.  Any political action needs to appeal to cognitive 
senses and have a normative backing, the underlying interests notwithstanding.  The failure to 
recognize these shared ideas and perceptions and their role in mediating political action leaves an 
essential variable outside the equation of politics.  
The incompleteness of rationalist characterization of federal relations in the 1990s 
became apparent with Putin’s successful effort to overhaul Russia’s federal system.  Not only did 
Putin undertake an increasingly centralizing policy early in his presidency, the puzzling fact is 
that he did it successfully with no real resistance from the regions.  How was that possible if 
                                                 
12 Cameron Ross, “Federalism and Electoral Authoritarianism in Russia,” Demokratizatsiya: The 
Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization 13 (3), 2005, p. 355. 
13 Richard Sakwa, “Putin’s New Federalism,” EWI Russian Regional Report 5 (21) 31 May, 
2000. 
14  Herd 1999. 
15 Ross 2005, 355; Vladimir Gelman, Vozvraschenie Leviafana? Politika retsentralizatsii v sov-
remennoi Rossii, POLIS (2) 2006. 
16 Consuelo Cruz, Political Culture and Institutional Development in Costa Rica and Nicaragua 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p.1. 
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regions were powerful and, in fact, most powerful at the end of Yeltsin’s tenure?17  Where have 
their “structural power resources” - such as economic wealth, geographical location, administra-
tive status - that determined center-regional dynamic in the 1990s gone?
18
 Why did not gover-
nors use any levers of power to oppose the reforms that endangered their position? Why did they 
yield to one-sided fiscal recentralization? What does such quick transformation of Russian 
federal relations say about the nature of regional power?  This puzzle became especially striking 
after Putin’s 2004 reform replacing popular gubernatorial elections with an appointment system.  
Instead of opposing this action that removed the key source of gubernatorial autonomy vis-à-vis 
the center, most regional governors including most influential backed Putin’s reform.  Chal-
lenges were rare.
19
   
The lack of any substantial resistance, the ease and the speed with which the reform of 
state governance in Russia was implemented is truly baffling, especially when viewed within the 
analytical frame used to analyze center-regional relations in the 1990s.  As Paul Goode noted, 
“the dominant expectation emerging from the literature on regionalism in the 1990s was that 
regionalism would persist and the central state would remain weak. Hence, few observers 
expected at the start of Putin’s presidency that his attempts to rein in the governors would suc-
ceed.”20 Echoing those expectations The New York Times observed prior to presidential elections 
                                                 
17 Oxana Oracheva “The Dilemmas of Federalism: Moscow and the Regions in the Russian 
Federation,” in Yitzhak Brudny, Jonathan Frankel, Stefani Hoffman, eds., Restructuring Post-Com-
munist Russia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 206.  See also Graeme B. Robertson, 
The Politics of Protest in Hybrid Regimes: Managing Dissent in Post-Communist Russia (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 109-12.  
18 Soderlund 2003. 
19 On reaction to this reform, see Darrell Slider, “Putin and the Russian Electoral System: 
‘Reforms’ to Prevent Regime Change,” The Soviet and Post-Soviet Review 34 (1) 2007, p. 55 
20 Goode 2010, p 235.  
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6 
in March 2000 that, “Few expect Mr. Putin to start a costly and even dangerous political clash 
with regional leaders any time soon.”21  Yet that is exactly what happened two months later.  
The key elements of Putin’s federal reform involved the creation of seven federal districts 
in May 2000 and the start of a legal harmonization campaign to bring regional charters and 
republican constitutions in line with federal legislation, the reform of the Federation Council, the 
reform of the taxation system in favor of centralizing financial resources and the new legislation 
granting the president the right to dismiss regional governors and dissolve regional legislatures. 
Less than a year prior to these reforms, the regional governors challenged the Kremlin with a 
radical overhaul of the national power balance when they organized the electoral bloc Father-
land-All Russia. Citing potential gubernatorial opposition in the fall of 1999 political commen-
tators doubted the Kremlin’s capacity to announce the emergency situation after the Chechen 
incursion into Dagestan.
22
  In the following months the political context in Russia was reconfig-
ured so radically that Putin’s ambitious steps in reforming federal relations evoked practically no 
open opposition.  What was unimaginable a year earlier went practically unchallenged. 
This puzzle has been addressed by scholars of Russian federalism, especially in the view 
of Putin’s 2004 decision to abolish gubernatorial elections.  Several experts argued that the shift 
in gubernatorial selection mechanism, seemingly undermining the autonomy of regional leaders, 
has actually benefited them.
23
 This interest-centered view presented governors as ‘smart guys’ 
who behaved counter-intuitively because they foresaw the longer-term benefits from this reform. 
                                                 
21 Celestine Bohlen, “Russian Regions Wary As Putin Tightens Control,” New York Times 
March 09, 2000.  
22 Evgenii Iur’ev, “Prezidentskoe ispytanie Chechnei,” Segodnia 15 September 1999. 
23 Goode 2007; Helge Blakkisrud, “The Rise and Fall of the Russian Governor: Institutional 
Design vs. Elite Bargaining as Explanatory Factors in Russian Politics.” In Elites and Democratic Devel-
opment in Russia, edited by Anton Steen and Vladimir Gel’man. (London: Routledge, 2003); Slider 2007; 
Robertson 2011, p. 155. 
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The problem with this argument is however that it could only be made post hoc.  It was not obvi-
ous that governors would assume this version of rational behavior instead of a more defensive 
one.
24
  After all, they have been in effect ‘cornered’ by the cascade of federal reforms during 
2000-2004.  The elimination of gubernatorial elections sought to integrate them into the execu-
tive vertical of power removing the autonomous power source allowed by the electoral mecha-
nism. Journalists questioned governors on their attitudes towards reforms expecting a more defi-
ant stance.
25
  It is not convincing that the governors themselves perceived these reforms in radi-
cally different terms.  Even if they did, there is still something missing: how and why have they 
come to such radical re-interpretation of their interests going against their modus operandi in the 
1990s? 
Putin himself realized that his reform package was an assault on governors and included 
such palliative measures as creating the State Council and granting regional governors the right 
to dismiss lower-level state officials. These measures signaled that Putin was concerned with 
gubernatorial reaction but they could not mask his intentions.  The State Council was merely a 
consultative body ‘near the president’ – a far cry from the constitutionally empowered Federa-
tion Council that could play a meaningful role in national politics.  As for the governors’ added 
powers vis-à-vis lower-level state officials, this measure also fell short of becoming a meaningful 
“carrot.”  The mayors of the capital cities - the governors’ main political opponents – were 
excluded from the list of officials who the governors could dismiss.     
Finally, the interest-based logic does not allow for any degree of diversity of interests 
among regional leaders. The loss of the popular base of power was arguably more costly to the 
                                                 
24 Goode (2010, p. 233) has also noted the uncertainty surrounding Putin’s federal initiatives. 
25 Interviews with Shaimiev by Dorenko and Svanidze in May 2000 are revealing. Available at: 
http://shaimiev.tatar.ru/pub/view/672, and http://shaimiev.tatar.ru/pub/view/671 
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strong leaders of ethnic republics who constructed electoral machines and could use their popu-
larly legitimated positions to bargain with the center. Some type of open and coordinated 
resistance could have been expected on their part; no a priori assessment of interests could have 
predicted their actual behavior.   
Other scholars focused on the structural conditions that allowed for an easy passage of 
reforms noting particularly the political consolidation in the center and the resulting capacity to 
implement reforms.
26
 This view treats the regional autonomy of the 1990s as an outcome of 
political and institutional conflicts in the center.  The increase in regional influence following the 
1998 financial crisis and gubernatorial activity in the 1999 parliamentary elections created the 
demand for recentralization that was effectively undertaken by Putin, who lacked any debt to the 
regional elite.
27
 The dramatic loss of the gubernatorial electoral bloc in the elections added 
another reason for gubernatorial compliance and bandwagoning. 
This structural argument adds an important missing piece to the picture, balancing out the 
actor-centered perspective with an understanding of structural circumstances in which the 
reforms were undertaken. It does however run into a danger of confusing the reform outcomes 
with the cause of their success if no further attempt is made to elaborate the various dimensions 
of those structural circumstances that also involve discursive opportunity structures or “ideas in 
the larger political culture that are believed to be ‘sensible,’ ‘realistic,’ and ‘legitimate’”.28 Fed-
eral reform was Putin’s first big initiative crucial for state centralization and power consolida-
tion.  The claim that regional autonomy was a result of a weak center while centralization was 
                                                 
26 Gelman 2006; Donna Bahry, “The New Federalism and The Paradoxes of Regional Sover-
eignty in Russia,” Comparative Politics 37 (2), 2005, pp. 127-146. 
27 Gelman 2006; Bahry 2005, pp. 127-128. 
28 Holly J. McCammon, Harmony D. Newman, Courtney Sanders Muse, Teresa M. Terrel, 
“Movement Framing and Discursive Opportunity Structures,” American Sociological Review 72 (5), 
October 2007, p. 731. 
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enabled by a strong center cannot be sustained because the center’s strength is endogenous to 
reforms.  In both cases, center-regional relations were an essential factor making the central state 
weak or strong. The acclaimed centralization under Putin was in large part the outcome of fed-
eral reforms rather than a condition for their success.  
In a more unorthodox fashion, Donna Bahry challenged the conventional wisdom on 
Russian federalism suggesting that the degree of regional autonomy in the 1990s was in fact very 
limited.
29
  According to Bahry, it was limited by the inability of the center to develop effective 
market infrastructure, by the center’s direct control of foreign trade through quotas and licensing, 
by fiscal centralization and other dependences on the center that impeded regional ability to cre-
ate an independent economic base.  Echoing Bahry’s assertion that regional autonomy was lim-
ited in the 1990s in this article I draw attention to different, non-material, sources of these limi-
tations.  The rationalist analysis of the evolution of Russian federalism places too much emphasis 
on regional power and self-assertion as presumably unavoidable process determined by objective 
structures. It downplays and even ignores the importance of ideas and, specifically, a powerful 
discourse legitimizing the project of regional autonomy made available by the historical juncture 
of the early 1990s.  The regional elites benefitted from mobilizing the dominant frame promoted 
by Russia’s central elites but found themselves stripped of influential justifications for continu-
ing the ‘autonomy-oriented’ course of action when Russia’s new president articulated a new 
frame.  Better matching the new historical momentum the new frame did not leave any space for 
regional demands.  
 
The Determinants of Regional Action: Integrating Ideas with Interests and Objective with 
Discursive Structures 
                                                 
29 Bahry 2005. 
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Social action has different dimensions and can be analyzed according to different logics.  An 
actor (in our case regions and the center) can act rationally (or instrumentally, with a view to 
realizing a goal) or normatively (in accordance with socially-sanctioned norms and ideas).  There 
is dramaturgical action that involves “the purposeful and expressive disclosure of one’s subjec-
tivity (feelings, desires, experiences, identity),”30 and communicative action or interaction that 
refers to “the linguistically mediated, intersubjective process through which actors establish their 
interpersonal relations and coordinate their action, through negotiating definitions of the situation 
(norms) and coming to an agreement.”31  These different dimensions or logics of actions are not 
necessarily contradictory and incompatible with each other.  Combining the instrumental and the 
normative logics Consuelo Cruz has posited that actor’s behavior should be comprehended using 
the concept of “normative realism:” “Actors are realistic because in the pursuit of their agendas, 
they seek a reasonable grip on the possibility of things… Their realism is normative because dif-
ficult it may be to quantify normative imperatives, any seasoned actor knows that in politics, as 
in other domains of life, people look for compelling reasons to select one alternative over another 
when facing a difficult choice.”32  Therefore, neither the interest-based nor the norms-based con-
ceptions of behavior are complete by themselves.  Interests and intersubjectively shared ideas 
about what is appropriate and acceptable in a particular context must be analyzed together to 
understand the logic of regional action.
33
  Such integration of instrumental and normative logics 
still is not sufficient for understanding political behavior and outcomes.  Intersubjective under-
                                                 
30 Jean Cohen, “Strategy or Identity:  New Theoretical Paradigms and Contemporary Social 
Movements,” Social Research 52 (4), 1985, p. 706. 
31 Ibid., p. 707. 
32 Cruz 2006, p. 2. 
33 Schmidt and Radaelli 2004.  
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standing emerges as a result of communicative action whereby different political actors advance 
their, potentially clashing definitions of the main problems and their solutions, and negotiate to 
arrive at a mutually shared understanding of the situation, indicating that a particular rhetorical 
frame becomes dominant. 
The idea of rhetorical frames and their role in politics has been advanced by constructiv-
ists focusing on ideas and collective meaning systems.  Particularly, the term is commonly used 
in social movement literature that introduced the term “discursive opportunity structures”34 and 
focused on the role of framing (or meaning construction) done by movement activists to mobilize 
for political action.
35
 Politicians use rhetorical frames to construct persuasion strategies in estab-
lishing competitive power claims. Cruz argued that political rivalries give rise to particular rhe-
torical frames that emerge as dominant at critical junctures in the history of a nation and that 
engender a collective field of imaginable possibilities defined as “a restricted array of plausible 
scenarios of how the world can or cannot be changed and how the future ought to look.”36 Thus, 
different frames could compete but those that emerge as dominant set the boundaries for political 
action.       
                                                 
34 Ruud Koopmans and Paul Statham, “Ethnic and Civic Conceptions of Nationhood and the 
Differential Success of the Extreme Right in Germany and Italy,” in Marco Giugni, Doug McAdam and 
Charles Tilly , eds., How Social Movements Matter (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 
pp. 225-51.    
35 See for example McCammon et al. 2007; Ruud Koopmans and Susan Olzak, “Discursive 
Opportunities and the Evolution of Right Wing Violence in Germany,” American Journal of Sociology 
110 (1), July 2004, 198-230;  William Gamson and David Meyer, “Framing Political Opportunity,” in 
Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, eds., Comparative Perspectives on Social 
Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures and Cultural Framings (Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1996), pp. 275-90; David A. Snow, “Framing Processes, Ideology, and Discursive Fields,” in 
David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule and Hanspeter Kriesi, eds., The Blackwell Companion to Social Move-
ments (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), pp. 380-412.    
36 Consuelo Cruz, “Identity and Persuasion: How Nations Remember Their Past and Make 
Their Futures,” World Politics 52 (3), 2000, p. 277. 
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That persuasion strategies are constructed does not mean that politicians could freely 
invent and use any argument to defend their power claims.  Political invention is a constrained 
activity embedded in the pre-existing “collective field of imaginable possibilities.”37  To become 
influential the frame must be relevant in the context of the recent social and political experience 
and resonate with public attitudes.  In fact, resonance has been theorized as one of the elements 
of discursive opportunities (along with legitimacy and visibility) that make political mobilization 
more likely.
38
   
The discursive fields encompass “master frames” defined as “a kind of master algorithm 
that colors and constrains the orientations and activities of other movements”39 and “cultural 
frames” referring to culturally embedded “primary frameworks of everyday life.”40  These con-
cepts have been shown to matter for the political effectiveness of frames.
41
  Political actors can 
use these discursive elements to enhance the legitimacy and public resonance of their frames and 
the likelihood that they become dominant.  Visibility is another factor that influences a frame’s 
effectiveness and is particularly important in the authoritarian context with communication 
channels controlled.  The nature of the public sphere and the mass media condition how frames 
are delivered and whose messages get heard.  
With these concepts in mind, below I focus on the evolution of dominant rhetorical 
frames in post-communist Russia to argue that regional behavior – assertive in the 1990s and 
                                                 
37 Ibid. 
38 Koopmans and Olzak 2004. 
39 Nancy Whittier quoting Benford and Snow (2000), “Consequences of Social Movements for 
Each Other,” in David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule and Hanspeter Kriesi, eds., The Blackwell Companion to 
Social Movements (Blackwell Publishing, 2004), p. 536.  Robert Benford and David A. Snow, “Framing 
Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment,” Annual Review of Sociology 26, 2000, 
611-39.      
40 Snow 2004, p. 385. 
41 McCammon et al. 2007 
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acquiescent in the 2000s – is best understood in the context of changing discursive opportunity 
structures and shifting rhetorical frames defining the key challenges confronting the Russian 
state and society. 
The Achilles Heel of the Republican Sovereignty 
Regions were among the first ‘victims’ of the restoration of the ‘power vertical’ commenced by 
Putin in 2000.  To understand the unexpectedly quick regional retreat we need to change our 
view about the basis of regional power in the 1990s, paying more attention to the source of the 
regional sense of entitlement in that period. The ethnic republics - the most notorious ‘sepa-
ratists’ and ‘power-wielders’ – drew their sense of entitlement from the rhetorical frame that 
privileged the ideas of democracy and national self-determination and allowed for fusing the 
pursuit of democracy with the pursuit of federalism and regional autonomy.  
 Tracing discourses across Russia’s vast territory is an immense task.  To surmount it, I 
focus on the Republic of Tatarstan, the pivotal case, and rely on the analysis of speeches, inter-
views and writings of Tatarstan’s first president, Mintimer Shaimiev,42 one of the most politi-
cally astute regional leaders in the Russian Federation; as well as the annual addresses to the 
Federal Assembly of Russia’s first two presidents and other sources.  The choice of Tatarstan 
and its president is not accidental.  Shaimiev was widely recognized as one of the role models for 
other regional (and especially ethnic) leaders in Russia
43
 that had most to lose from recentraliza-
tion and whose acquiescence is most surprising and in need of careful analysis.  
Most explanations for the greater autonomy obtained by ethnic republics point to greater 
structural resources and particularly the privileged status conferred to republics by the institu-
                                                 
42 Replaced by Rustem Minnikhanov in March 2010. 
43 Among the first regions to declare sovereignty in August 1990, Tatarstan first signed a bilat-
eral agreement with Moscow in February 1994, and led in creating the electoral bloc that posited political 
challenge to the Kremlin in 1999 elections.   
Sharafutdinova, Gestalt Switch 
 
14 
tional structure of Soviet and then Russian federalism.
44
  The institutional explanation focused on 
the federal design and the higher status of ethnic republics is powerful and speaks to their sense 
of entitlement.  The status was however enshrined both in the Soviet and the Russian constitu-
tions.  Why were the claims made in the early 1990s?  How and why were the republican elites 
able to obtain as much autonomy when they did?  While federal design represented a necessary 
pre-condition, the historical momentum prioritized specific resources (such as ethnicity) and cre-
ated an opening for concrete actions legitimated by the rhetorical frame that came to dominate at 
the time. 
Specifically, the late 1980s in the Soviet Union gave rise to the frame in which the ideas 
of democratization and national self-determination were amalgamated.  Such ideological con-
coction became possible as Gorbachev’s ideas of glasnost and democratization awakened and 
linked up with the cause of national self-determination in the union republics of the USSR.  
“[T]he idea of nationalism is impossible--indeed unthinkable—without the idea of democracy, 
and [that] democracy never exists without nationalism. The two are joined in a sort of compli-
cated marriage, unable to live without each other, but coexisting in an almost permanent state of 
tension,” suggested in 1992 Ghia Nodia, political philosopher from Georgia.45 This blend was 
behind most of the claims made by various political forces not only in the late Soviet Union but 
also in newly democratizing Eastern Europe and, later, Russia.
46
 Political entrepreneurs who tied 
democratization and national self-determination won political battles as exemplified by the 
                                                 
44 Soderlund 2003; Treisman (1997); Solnick (2000). 
45 Ghia Nodia, “Nationalism and Democracy,” Journal of Democracy 3 (4), 1992, 3-22.  
46 On Eastern Europe, see Vladimir Tismaneanu, Fantasies of Salvation: Democracy, National-
ism, and Myth in Post-Communist Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).  On Russia, see 
Jeffrey Kahn, Federalism, Democratization, and the Rule of Law in Russia (New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press 2002), pp. 87-96. 
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Baltic republics
47
 and made this frame powerful. The same frame assisted Yeltsin’s victory in his 
rivalry with Gorbachev.
48
 Indeed, it is Yeltsin’s political victory in 1991 that legitimated these 
ideas further.  His ideology and strategy of “sovereignization” of Russia is crucial for under-
standing the subsequent process of regional “sovereignization.” 
Considered as “homelands” for specific ethnic minorities, republics within Russia had all 
the structural preconditions (i.e., sizable ethnic minorities) enabling them to use this frame in 
their autonomy claims vis-à-vis the federal center.  Revealingly, Rafael Khakimov, Tatarstan’s 
chief political ideologue, starts the compilation of his political essays with two 1989 articles that 
advocate democratization through reforming Russian federalism and national self-determination 
of the Tatar people.
49
  Not only did the regional elites rely on the frame made available by the 
Union Republics, but they reframed it into the pursuit of democratic federalism. The advocacy of 
‘democratic federalism,’ ‘truly democratic federation,’ and ‘principles of democratic federation’ 
is the most continuous theme in Shaimiev’s speeches during the 1990s. The words democ-
racy/democratic and federation/federalism are almost inseparable in most of his speeches.  On 
the 10
th
 anniversary of Tatarstan’s Declaration of Sovereignty he posited that, “federalism is 
nothing but the territorial carcass of democracy.”50  “No doubt,” claimed Shaimiev, “that Russia 
made a pro-democracy choice which also means a pro-federalism choice.  Any retreat from fed-
eralism in multinational Russia is likely to mean a retreat from democracy.”51   
                                                 
47 On Baltic states, see Daina Stukuls Eglitis, Imagining the Nation: History, Modernity, and 
Revolution in Latvia (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2005). 
48Archie Brown, Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and Putin: Political Leadership in Russia’s Transition 
(Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001).  
49 Rafael Khakimov, Ternisty put’ k svobode (Tatarskoe knizhnoe izdatelstvo, 2007), pp. 6-24. 
50 Mintimer Shaimiev, “Desiat’ let po puti ukrepleniia suvereniteta,” August 29, 2000. 
51 Ibid. 
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The reframing of national self-determination theme into the discourse of federalism was 
helpful to the elites in territorially (rather than ethnically) defined regions that did not have the 
opportunity to claim national self-determination. The process of Russian regionalization there-
fore was not confined to ethnic republics only. The availability of this framing strategy encour-
aged and enabled the elites in predominantly Russian regions to advocate for autonomy.
52
  Not 
surprisingly, it was Shaimiev advocating for federal Russia rather than Chechnya’s Djohar 
Dudaev equating national self-determination with full independence, who became one of the 
most respected regional politicians in Russia.  
This framing strategy enabled the elites in Russia’s ethnic republics to not only claim 
autonomy from the federal center but also enact these claims in a series of performative actions, 
whereby the republics asserted their rights over greater political and economic resources than 
those available to the rest of regions in Russia. Paradoxically, the ethnic republics simply copied 
Yeltsin’s moves adopting declarations of sovereignty, introducing the post of the president and 
holding elections. Shaimiev noted with regard to these developments that,  
Tatarstan declared its sovereignty after Russia has adopted its declaration of state sover-
eignty which extended the right of national self-determination to Russia’s people.  I should 
also note that all the following steps undertaken by Tatarstan corresponded to Russian and 
international norms adhered to by Russia and did not cross the boundaries of the civilized 
legal space.
53
 
 
The republican strategies in “projecting sovereignty” are best explored in Tatarstan’s 
case. Katherine Graney’s examination of it reveals that the process of “formulating a new vision 
of itself” by the republic involved both “an institutional, material dimension and a discursive, 
                                                 
52 Goode 2011, Herrera 2005. 
53 Shaimiev 2000. 
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symbolic dimension.”54  Institutional strategies included adopting and spreading official national 
documents, establishing the norms and practices of citizenship, creating universal educational 
systems.
55
 Symbolic strategies involved building the collective memories by writing and rewrit-
ing national histories, creating national symbols and holidays, building museums and monu-
ments.
56
 Although Tatarstan’s sovereignty project was most “comprehensive, sustained and 
effective” relative to other ethnic republics,57 Graney’s analysis applies to other republics as 
well. Bashkortostan, Sakha, Tuva and others have emulated these strategies, learned from each 
other and from Russia itself in the first place.   
In short, the reliance on the dominant rhetorical frame that fused ideas of democracy and 
federalism enabled regional elites in Russia to act boldly vis-à-vis the federal center, not only 
demanding more rights, but effectively asserting them. Remarkably, democratic federalism was 
not only the goal declared by regional elites but by Russia’s national leaders.  The idea that fed-
eralism is the territorial basis of democracy in Russia first appeared in Yeltsin’s 1994 annual 
address to the Federal Assembly.  The words democracy/democratic and federal/federalism were 
used heavily in Yeltsin’s other speeches and his 1994 annual address has an entire section dedi-
cated to issues of federalism, positing it as a central theme on the agenda of the Russian govern-
ment. As shrewdly noted by Shaimiev with regard to Yeltsin’s famous declaration in Kazan 
“take as much sovereignty as you can swallow,” “you had to be there, along with him, to under-
stand that he could not say anything else!  The person who lead the country on the path of 
                                                 
54 Katherine Graney, Of Khans and Kremlins: Tatarstan and the Future of Ethno-Federalism in 
Russia (Lexington Books, 2009), p. xxv.  
55 Ibid., p. xxviii 
56 Ibid., p. xxviii. 
57 Ibid., p. xxxii 
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reforms simply did not have the right not to say something along those lines.”58 There was a 
clear societal demand for a specific rhetoric and any reasonable politician had to deliver. 
Admittedly, the republican strategies for ‘projecting sovereignty’ would not have worked 
if it were not for a particular political context.  While the republican claims were well grounded 
in the dominant narrative, mere existence of this narrative was arguably not sufficient for under-
taking such radical actions as declarations of sovereignty or non-payment of taxes to the center.  
This discursive strategy became consequential in a given political context. At the height of their 
rivalry, both Gorbachev and Yeltsin tried to maintain ethnic republics’ support, thus strengthen-
ing the republican elites’ bargaining position.59  Gorbachev invited the republics to participate in 
the negotiations over the new Union treaty,
60
 while Yeltsin offered republican leaders to sign a 
Federation treaty, both leaders promoting the same discursive frame. Although this political 
dynamic setting the republics in between the two rival leaders disintegrated with the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, even with the elimination of one of the power centers, the authorities in Mos-
cow did not consolidate.  In 1992-93 the republics could maneuver between the conflicting exec-
utive and legislative branches of power, taking advantage of the existing political rivalries.
61
   
The existence of such political opportunities, however, still leaves analytical space for 
taking into account the discursive field and the particular frame that provided the rationale for 
claim-making by regional elites. The bold autonomy-seeking actions of the early 1990s were in 
no way “natural” for the regional elites and were not predetermined by the rivalries in the center.  
                                                 
58 Mintimer Shaimiev, “Iz slabyh regionov sil’noi Rossii ne postroish,” Rossiiskaya Gazeta 12 
February, 2000. Available at: http://pred.president.tatar.ru/pub/view/650 
59 Kahn 2002, pp. 93-101. 
60 Ibid, p. 95. 
61 See, for example, Cameron Ross, “Federalism and Democratization in Russia,” Communist 
and Post-Communist Studies 33 (2000), p. 406.   
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It is worth remembering that most of these regional leaders represented the former Soviet 
nomenklatura and were socialized into a different type of behavior vis-à-vis the center.  Being 
shrewd politicians however they adapted to the changing political environment and to the new 
rhetorical frame that both burdened them with the expectations of greater local accountability 
and vested them with the greater sense of entitlement.
62
  After all, the new autonomy claims and 
the insubordinate behavior were part and parcel of the political toolkit whereby not only regional 
but Russia’s national elites represented what/who they were.  Regional autonomy was framed to 
be the new regional interest within the discursive field that was constitutive of Russia’s political 
space in the early 1990s. The regional behavior was driven by both a careful consideration of 
what is appropriate and acceptable (the dominant political discourse) and the regional interests in 
autonomy promoted by that new discourse.  Such view adds an important nuance to understand-
ing regionalism of the 1990s and helps unravel the puzzle of ‘easy’ recentralization of the 2000s.  
 
Putin and the New Rhetorical Frame: “Bei Chechniu, Spasai Rossiiu!”63 
The discursive field constitutive of Russia’s political space was radically reconfigured under 
Putin. The analysis of Putin’s annual addresses to the Federal Assembly during 2000-2007 
reveals a striking discursive shift away from the ideas of federalism and democracy and towards 
the ideas of strengthening the state and building an effective ‘vertical of power.’  If in 2000 
address Putin made twelve references to democratic/democracy (compared to Yeltsin’s 30-40 
references in 1994-1996), in 2001 and 2002 the number of references drops to 1, and increases 
insignificantly in the following years (between 2 and 9) but only to refer more to the newly 
                                                 
62 Suffice to say that those who did not adapt, such as Doku Zavgaev, the party leader in 
Chechnya, were quickly sidelined. 
63 In English, “Beat Chechnya, Save Russia.” 
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invented notion of ‘sovereign democracy.’64 The references to the concept of federalism are 
absent entirely in Putin’s addresses starting in 2001.  How do we explain such radical discursive 
shift?  Understanding it requires an assessment of the political situation in Russia in the late 
1990s and the presence of structural conditions inviting political change.  It is also important to 
look at the tactical aspect of how political change was brought about: which political actors had 
mobilized, what methods they used, and how they justified their actions. 
 The structural opening for the radical re-orientation of public discourse in Russia 
occurred as a result of several events that included the 1998 financial crisis and a series of events 
in August-September of 1999 involving a new crisis in the Caucasus and a wave of terrorist 
bombings in Moscow and several other cities in Russia.  The 1998 financial crisis hit the popu-
lation with the rising prices resulting from a significant ruble depreciation.
65
  Facing political 
backlash Yeltsin nominated Yevgenii Primakov to head the new government that proved to be 
successful in averting the widely expected and feared social, political and economic collapse.  
Primakov’s personal popularity grew rapidly, while Yeltsin was confronted with plunging popu-
lar support rates and the impeachment proceedings started in the State Duma.
66
  By the spring of 
1999 Primakov emerged as a politician that could respond to the growing popular desire for 
change and offer an alternative path for Russia. Doubting his loyalty, in May 1999 Yeltsin 
                                                 
64 See Masha Lipman, “Putin’s Sovereign Democracy,” Washington Post, July 15, 2006. 
65On crisis and its impact, see Jacques Sapir, “Russia's Crash of August 1998: Diagnosis and 
Prescription,” Post-Soviet Affairs 15 (1) 1999, 1-36; Philip Hanson, “The Russian Economic Crisis and 
the Future of Russian Economic Reform,” Europe-Asia Studies 51 (7), 1999, 1141-66. 
66 For popular opinion about Primakov’s government, see polls by FOM, (Public Opinion Fund) 
at: http://bd.fom.ru/cat/power/pow_gov/government_primakov. 
On Yeltsin’s ratings, see http://bd.fom.ru/cat/pres/eltzin_/rating_eltsin. 
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sacked Primakov, replacing him with Sergei Stepashin, the head of Russia’s Ministry of 
Interior
67
 who was also replaced three months later by Vladimir Putin. 
 This string of political reshuffling in the upper echelons of the Russian government 
revealed Yeltsin’s acute insecurity.  Hemorrhaging power and influence, Yeltsin was leaving the 
political scene with the sense of defeat: the rhetorical frame that brought him to power, moti-
vated and underpinned his reforms was ‘burnt out.’ The once popular rhetoric of democratization 
was discredited as a result of political and economic developments in the 1990s.
68
 Not surpris-
ingly, the references to democracy diminish in Yeltsin’s annual addresses starting in 1997 and 
drop to the low of three references in 1997 from the high of 42 in 1994.  Any sense of earlier 
accomplishments was overwhelmed by popular frustrations and disappointments, the perceived 
and real decline not only of Russia’s economy and people’s personal well-being, but also of 
Russia’s stature in the world.69 The rhetoric of self-determination and federalism that drove polit-
ical events in the early 1990s appeared dangerous with the new flare of conflict in the Caucasus.  
Yeltsin’s final address to the Russian population on December 31, 1999 reflected this sense of 
defeat:  
Today, on this incredibly important day for me, I want to say more personal words than I 
usually do. I want to ask you for forgiveness, because many of our hopes have not come 
true, because what we thought would be easy turned out to be painfully difficult. I ask to 
forgive me for not fulfilling some hopes of those people who believed that we would be 
able to jump from the grey, stagnating, totalitarian past into a bright, rich and civilized 
future in one go. I myself believed in this.[…]70  
 
                                                 
67 Over 80% of respondents reacted negatively to this Yeltsin’s decision 
(http://bd.fom.ru/report/cat/power/pow_gov/government_primakov/of19992002). 
68 Ellen Carnaghan, Out of Order: Russian Political Values in an Imperfect World (University 
Park: Penn State University Press, 2007). 
69 See the results of a public opinion poll in January 2000 at: 
http://wciom.ru/arkhiv/tematicheskii-arkhiv/item/single/502.html?no_cache=1&cHash=5f8ad22565 
70 The English version is available at:  http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6584973.stm 
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In short, this juncture in Russia’s history provided an opening for new ideas. At least two alter-
natives emerged: Primakov and political forces supporting him, and Putin, Yeltsin’s chosen suc-
cessor. The resolution of the clash between these two rival forces determined the path Russian 
politics took after Yeltsin’s resignation and the rhetorical frame that came to dominate and con-
strain the type of policies that could be realistically pursued by political actors. 
 The first political grouping consisted of powerful regional governors and two parties 
organized in 1998-1999 that merged in May 1999 to form an electoral bloc Otechestvo-Vsya 
Rossia (OVR, Fatherland-All Russia).
71
 This electoral bloc featured such influential regional 
leaders as Yurii Luzhkov (mayor of Moscow), Vladimir Yakovlev  (mayor of St. Petersburg) and 
Mintimer Shaimiev (president of Tatarstan).  Primakov joined OVR as number one in its list of 
candidates for the December 1999 parliamentary election. Having attracted influential regional 
leaders, this electoral bloc was perceived as a real threat to the Kremlin.  It was however weak 
ideologically advancing no clear ideas and policies aside from such vague and catch-all goals 
advocated in OVR manifesto as, (1) supporting domestic manufacturers and protecting the 
domestic market; (2) developing the real sector and reinforcing the regulatory role of the state; 
(3) supporting agriculture; (4) increasing people's income; (5) supporting the Russian family, 
etc."
72
  This manifesto reflected the governors’ understanding of Russia’s problems including 
their vision of federal relations: 
 The major problem facing the current phase of political development in Russia is the 
imbalance in relations between the federal center and the regions. Russia is strong not 
only in its entirety, but also in the diversity of its constituent parts. We must preserve this 
                                                 
71 On electoral politics in 1999-2000, see Henry Hale, “The Origins of United Russia and the 
Putin Presidency: The Role of Contingency in Party-System Development,” Demokratizatsiya 12 (2) 
2004, 169-94.  
72Aleksandr Buzgalin, “Fatherland-All Russia: Governors of All Oblasts, Unite?” Prism  (5) 18, 
Jamestown Foundation, October 22, 1999. 
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asset. The federal center must continue to be strong. But in a democratic state it is essen-
tial to combine its authority and might with the authority and might of the regions....
73
  
 
 In essence, these governors were calling for strengthening the state and the regions. This federal 
part of their message was rendered incongruous by the political developments in August-
September 1999. 
 The chain of events that “changed the course of history”74 involved first an armed assault 
on Dagestan undertaken in August 1999 by the extremist military groupings from Chechnya.  
Along with this incursion, a series of apartment bombings occurred in Moscow and several other 
Russian cities.  These blasts were blamed on the Chechens as well, setting a stage for public out-
rage directed against Chechens, which in real life meant anyone with dark skin and Caucasian 
appearance.
75
  These shocking events and the reaction articulated by Putin explain his quick rise 
as an undisputed leader and the shift to a new rhetorical frame that reflected and embodied a 
reconfigured political scene. 
 How can Putin’s reaction be characterized?  A regional leader Ruslan Aushev described 
it most laconically, assessing Kremlin’s position by the slogan “Bei Chechniu, spasai Rossiiu” 
(beat Chechnya and save Russia).
76
  Putin’s reaction to these events was quick and tough both in 
words and actions.  Action-wise, Putin started an immediate military operation to quickly free 
Dagestan and re-establish federal control over Chechnya.  In terms of rhetoric, one of Putin’s 
infamous phrases, “We'll follow terrorists everywhere… Should we catch them in an outhouse, 
                                                 
73 Ibid. 
74William Sewell “Historical events as transformations of structures: Inventing revolution at the 
Bastille,” Theory and Society 25 (December 1996), 841-81. 
75 See for example John Russell, “Terrorists, bandits, spooks and thieves: Russian demonization 
of the Chechens before and since 9/11,” Third World Quarterly 26 (1), 101-16.  
76 “Bei Chechniu, spasai Rossiu,” Komsomol’skaia Pravda (October 2, 1999). 
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we'll kill them there"
77
 was coined during Putin’s press-conference in Astana (Kazakhstan) in 
September 1999.  Such resolve and tough action was exactly what the Russian public craved 
for.
78
  From a relatively unknown Kremlin bureaucrat, one of many such state officials, dis-
trusted by the weary public Putin quickly rose to public limelight.  His popularity ratings surged 
reflecting people’s growing confidence in Russia’s government and Putin personally.79 
 The war in Chechnya is widely considered to be a key to Putin’s victory in the 2000 
presidential election in Russia.
80
  It also determined the most important item for Russia’s new 
agenda in the new millennium - the rebuilding of the state and a consolidation of the centralized 
power vertical.  In retrospect, it is not surprising that in the context of an ongoing war in Chech-
nya Putin’s first steps as a president involved measures aimed at reintegrating Russia legally and 
politically.  The introduction of seven federal districts, the legal harmonization campaign and the 
reestablishment of control over regional branches of federal bureaucracy had all made a good 
political sense. Putin’s July 2000 address to the Federal Assembly conveyed his understanding of 
country’s main problems: “Ineffective state is the main reason for the long and deep economic 
crisis Russia has been undergoing…[  ]  Restoring order in state authorities is the main task we 
face today.”81  The resonance of this message with societal hopes and aspirations is clear from 
Putin’s popular ratings82 and support for his federal and other initiatives.83  Instructive is also 
                                                 
77 Even cruder in Russian: “v tualete poimaem, my i v sortire ih zamochim.” 
78 http://bd.fom.ru/report/cat/power/pow_gov/government_putin/ifp00477 
79 See opinion polls at: http://bd.fom.ru/cat/power/pow_gov/government_putin 
80 Peter Rutland, “Putin’s Path to Power,” Post-Soviet Affairs 16 (January-March) 2000, p. 322 
81Vladimir Putin, “Neeffektivnoe gosudarstvo – glavnaya prichina dlitel’nogo krizisa, ” Nezavi-
simaya gazeta 11 July 2000. 
82 http://www.levada.ru/prezident 
83 http://www.levada.ru/press/2000072401.html 
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how regional leaders reacted to Putin’s federal reforms. Shaimiev, for example, noted that 
Putin’s initiatives were driven by “real necessity”84 and suggested that, 
 All of Putin’s initiatives remain within the framework of Russia’s Constitution.  Whoever 
would have had become the president of Russia would have been obliged to start 
strengthening the state power […]. Therefore Putin’s initiatives should have been 
expected. […] Without strong and effective power reforms would have to be stalled.  I for 
one cannot imagine Tatarstan without strong and effective power. Only the person who 
does not know what the state power is could doubt the need for it to be stronger.
85
 
 
In another interview Shaimiev noted that, “without the effective vertical of power Putin will not 
be able to deliver on his promises to people.”86  In an ironic contrast to the 1990s when the 
regional leaders copied Yeltsin, this time it was Shaimiev’s turn to recognize that Putin was 
building a system akin to the one erected in Tatarstan even if it was happening at the expense of 
the republican sovereignty. An astute politician, Shaimiev, who stood most to lose from these 
reforms, recognized their rationale reiterating Putin’s rhetoric of strengthening the state power.   
The regional leaders found themselves disarmed and demobilized by the new rhetorical 
frame.  The new state-building agenda advanced by Putin meant that the basis for regional action 
driven by the sense of self-entitlement disappeared. In fact, the discourse combining the ideas of 
democratization, national self-determination and federalism was in the process of being disman-
tled for a while.  Starting with the 1996 presidential election Russian politics had been defined 
by such negative messages as the fear of communist come-back
87
 and, later, the need to avoid 
chaos in the wake of the 1998 financial crisis.  No strong positive messages emerged until 
Putin’s new agenda that focused on strengthening the state and, in the wake of August 1999 
                                                 
84Svanidze interview, 21 May, 2000. Available at: http://shaimiev.tatar.ru/pub/view/672  
85 Mintimer Shaimiev, “Diktatura v Rossii uzhe iskliuchena,” available at 
http://shaimiev.tatar.ru/pub/view/688   
86Dorenko interview, 20 May, 2000. Available at: http://shaimiev.tatar.ru/pub/view/671 
87 Michael McFaul, Russia's 1996 Presidential Election: The End of Polarized Politics (Stan-
ford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1997). 
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events, received wide popular endorsement.  No alternative visions could be legitimated given 
the rapid rise of the ‘Putin’s majority’ (putinskoe bol’shinstvo) – the alleged two thirds of Rus-
sian citizens who supported Putin.
88
  It is in this sense that the regional leaders were disarmed. In 
terms of the political action, Putin’s new agenda involved measures aimed at reining in the forces 
considered a threat to state’s integrity.  Regional elites along with some of the influential 
oligarchs were the first target.  Under serious political assault, the ‘rhetorically’ disarmed gover-
nors quickly surrendered. 
 
Interest-Based Argument 
 
The main alternative argument is driven by interest-based logic and could be outlined as follows.  
The post-1998 context strengthened regional governors responsible for the painful adjustment to 
post-devaluation economic realities. The upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections 
played an additional role in inciting governors’ political action in 1999 and formation of new 
political parties including Luzhkov’s Otechestvo, Yakovlev-Shaimiev-Rahimov’s Vsya Rossiia, 
Titov’s Golos Rossii, and Kremlin-supported Yedinstvo (Unity). This wave of political mobiliza-
tion is best comprehended by analyzing the structure of incentives driving regional political 
behavior at this particular moment characterized by political uncertainty and governors’ 
increased weight in the post-crisis context.
89
  The open clash between the Kremlin and the rival 
electoral bloc ended with regional defeat.  Political uncertainty has cleared and regional gover-
nors joined the winning side, supporting the new leader. Given such simple and powerful 
account, why invoke the concepts of discursive opportunities and rhetorical frames; why look 
                                                 
88 Yirii Chernega, “Putinskoe bol’shinstvo ochen’ ustoichivo,” Kommersant March 27, 2001.  
Found at: http://kommersant.ru/doc/251642.  
89 Hale 2006, Robertson 2011. 
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into the ideational basis of power?  I argue that the interest-based account is incomplete.  Even 
when accepting their defeat in the 1999 parliamentary elections, the governors did not have to 
quietly acquiesce to Putin’s radical reconfiguration of federal relations.  Losing parliamentary 
elections did not mean that they had to give in to centralization without any resistance.  These 
were the regional leaders still popularly elected and entrusted with legitimacy and authority by 
their respective populations.  The assault on regional leaders meant an assault on the regional 
population - the argument especially resonant in the case of ethnic republics meant to ensure 
self-governance for Russia’s largest ethnic groups.  The following analogy with political devel-
opments surrounding the 1993 Russian constitution elucidates this point. 
The 1992 Federal Treaty enshrined the special status of ethnic republics within the Rus-
sian Federation.  The regional leaders that took part in the Constitutional Assembly to draft 
Russia’s new constitution attempted to institutionalize their status as a preamble in the new con-
stitution.  They lost this cause however as the crisis over new Constitution escalated to a stand-
off between Yeltsin and the parliament in September 1993. This painful stand-off resolved 
through force created a new political environment comparable in some respects to post-1999 
parliamentary elections context.  In both cases regional leaders mobilized for a cause and lost.  
Their subsequent course of behavior however differed dramatically.  In 1993, despite the evi-
dence of Yeltsin’s political resolve and clearing of uncertainty, the regional leaders did not 
relent.  The case of Tatarstan where Shaimiev’s administration actively discouraged voter par-
ticipation in the referendum over the new Russian Constitution is exemplary.  The government of 
Tatarstan also insisted relentlessly on signing a bilateral treaty with Moscow to further institu-
tionalize their special status and privileges.  Eventually successful in signing such treaty in 
February 1994, Tatarstan set a precedent followed by other regions. 
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Historical analogies are never entirely accurate in accounting for all the factors that 
matter in each unique situation.  The important lesson here is that an obvious political defeat in 
one instance does not necessitate an acquiescent behavior subsequently because political struc-
tures “do not come with an instruction sheet”90 as to what type of behavior is “normatively real-
istic” at each particular moment.  Other factors have to be taken into account.  In the case of 
Tatarstan and other regions, I argue, it was the nature of discursive opportunities and specifically 
the power of the rhetorical frame highlighting ideas of democracy and self-determination that 
resonated strongly with politicians and the public enabling the republican leadership to persevere 
with assertive political action despite the changes in power configuration in the center.  Such dis-
cursive opportunities were not available to regional leaders in the 2000s. The dominant ideas of 
state consolidation swept away the basis for claim-laying by the regional leaders. 
 
The Rise and Fall of Rhetorical Frames: Theoretical Observations  
 The discursive opportunities and rhetorical frames are not the only meaningful causal 
variable in politics but rather one of the salient factors that help explain the choices made by 
political actors.  Along with institutions and more tangible resources that define the incentive 
structure for political action, discursive field provides the normative environment within which 
political action takes place. What can we learn about rhetorical frames from this case and how do 
these findings bear on theoretical concerns central to ideational analysis?  What do we learn 
about how ideas become dominant (or lose their eminence), how they get institutionalized, and 
how they affect political behavior? 
                                                 
90 Mark Blyth, “Structures Do Not Come with an Instruction Sheet,” American Political Science 
Review, December 2003, 1 (4), 695-706.  
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 With regard to the first question, this study supports the findings from earlier studies 
demonstrating that ideational shifts are generated by the dissatisfaction with pre-existing idea-
tional structures that fail to solve society’s most urgent problems and are frequently instigated by 
exogenous shocks that propel a rapid reconsideration of traditional frameworks.
91
  In Russia’s 
case, the dissatisfaction with the discourse focusing on democracy and federalism was ferment-
ing throughout the second half of the 1990s as the public witnessed the painful realities of cor-
rupt oligarchic capitalism and competition playing out regionally as well as nationwide.
92
  But 
the hasty search for new solutions was forced by the exogenous shocks of, first, the 1998 finan-
cial crisis, and the 1999 apartment bombings and Chechen terrorism that opened the political 
space for new ideas.  The Russian case also fits well with Peter Hall’s concept of policy para-
digms.  In Western European context Hall noted that “issues of authority are likely to be central 
to the process of paradigm change,” and that “the movement from one paradigm to another is 
likely to be preceded by significant shifts in the locust of authority over policy.”93  Similarly, the 
shift of the rhetorical frame in Russia occurred at the moment of power transition from Yeltsin to 
Putin, although various measures aimed at changing the nature of center-regional relations have 
been advanced earlier.
94
  Under Yeltsin these policies remained as half-measures and were fre-
quently ignored by regional leaders.  It took the transformation of the public field to bring the 
idea of strengthening the state to political prominence. 
                                                 
91 See Berman (2001, p. 234). 
92 See for example Gulnaz Sharafutdinova, Political Consequences of Crony Capitalism Inside 
Russia (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2011). 
93 Hall, p. 280. 
94 See for example Andreas Heineman-Gruder, “Is Russia’s Federalism Sustainable?” Perspec-
tives on European Politics and Society 3 (1), 2001, pp. 67-91; see also Tolz and Busygina 1998.  
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 Notably, the respect for centralized power and strong state are frequently argued to be 
elements of the ‘surviving past’ of ‘communism as a lived system of ideas.’95  Putin’s new frame 
therefore might be an ‘old wine in a new bottle’ and its wide popular appeal might result not only 
from the perceived chaos of the 1990s but also from the ideas more deeply rooted in the Russian 
culture and that might be considered as a ‘master frame.’  No wonder both political groupings 
rivaling in 1999 appealed to the idea of a strong state. 
There is an additional theoretical leverage in using the term discourse rather than ideas. 
Although discourse is commonly defined in terms of its content, as a set of ideas and values, it is 
also defined in terms of its usage, as the process of interaction focused on policy formulation and 
communication.
96
  As such, it draws attention to how ideas are communicated and how the 
means of communication influence their prominence. It is with regard to this issue that the 
Russian case contributes most analytically and points to differences in ideational shifts in a 
democratic and an authoritarian political context. Putin revealed an acute awareness of the 
importance of public discourse early in his presidency advancing in September 2000 the doctrine 
of national information that legitimized state control of mass media.  It was implemented in the 
following months and years as the government initiated a political campaign against such media 
owners as Gusinsky and Berezovsky, getting rid of private media outlets along with these notori-
ous oligarchs.
97
 
The media coverage of war in Chechnya that was crucial for Putin’s rise to power was tightly 
controlled by the state.  If the first war in Chechnya occurred in the context of free media, the 
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97 See for example Masha Lipman, “Constrained or Irrelevant: Media in Putin’s Russia,” Current 
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information released regarding the second war was mostly propaganda directed by strict censor-
ship from the Kremlin.
98
  No negative information about the Russian army was permitted; the 
amount of casualties was grossly underreported and the journalists that did try to report more 
truth from the war were harassed.
99
  This smooth coverage of war was complemented by an 
aggressive media attack on Kremlin’s political rivals prior to the 1999 parliamentary election.  
OVR’s top two leaders, Luzhkov and Primakov, were drowned in an ugly smear campaign 
broadcasted on the Kremlin-controlled television channels ruining the chances of “the best-
placed of all the parties.”100  Careful attention to media coverage was also evident in the subse-
quent election.  Putin’s presidential campaign was conspicuous in its absence showing him as an 
administrator and a manager rather than a politician fighting for power.  Putin refused to use his 
allocated free TV time and to engage in debates with his opponents while still receiving “about a 
third of the coverage that was given to all the candidates across all channels.”  His campaign was 
dominated by ‘Putin at work’ images placing him, in public opinion, above the ‘crowd’ strug-
gling for power.
101
  
Thus, strengthening the ideas that resonated with the Russian public was their mode of 
articulation and ‘delivery’ that occurred in the context of restricted media, making Putin’s 
message the only one visible to the public.  Both the ideational content of this frame and the way 
it was communicated to the public were important in the case of this discursive shift.  Without 
the heavy-handed control of the media and an ugly negative campaign unleashed against the 
rivals, the outcome of the political clash in the country might have been different.  It is plausible 
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though that even if the outcome of the political struggle were to be different, the new leadership 
of Russia would have had to adopt some version of the ideas outlined by Putin.  The widespread 
perception that the Russian state was captured under Yeltsin was there and, even if the specific 
policies were to be different, the idea of strengthening the state would have arguably been 
promoted by Primakov-Luhzkov coalition as well. Neither of the political alternatives would 
have involved an advocacy of further democratization and national self-determination on the part 
of Russia’s ethnic minorities.  The new momentum called for new (or newly rediscovered) ideas.  
 
Conclusion 
 When and how do political actors pick their fights?  The puzzle of Russian governors’ 
inaction in response to Putin’s centralizing reforms is used here to argue that interests are not 
sufficient by themselves to account for political behavior.  Understanding political action 
requires uncovering the grounds for its justification and legitimation.  Using the concepts of dis-
cursive opportunity structure and rhetorical frames, I reconsider the sources of power accrued by 
regional governors in the 1990s and draw attention to the ideas of democracy and federalism that 
together propelled autonomous behavior on the part of regional elites.  The shift of the dominant 
frame that occurred in Russia in 1999-2000 under Putin’s leadership brought to prominence the 
idea of strengthening the state power while retracting on the ideas of democracy and federalism.  
Defiant and autonomy-seeking behavior by regional elites became untenable and even seem 
dangerous to state’s integrity in such political context.  This ideational shift is central to under-
standing the regional behavior in response to centralization reforms in Russia. 
 
 
